The plan rebuilds every cryptographic primitive on hashes, in four areas: consensus signatures, data availability, account signatures and application proofs. What you can use now, what is coming, and the community’s own estimate of the threat beside its target dates.
Hashes are safe, STARK rollups are safe, and account abstraction (ERC-4337, EIP-7702) lets an institution run a post-quantum signature scheme on its own accounts today without waiting for the protocol. Few systems of comparable scale, on or off the internet, offer their users that option yet.
EIP-7702, live since May 2025 →
Signature agility by protocol rule (EIP-8141, scheduled for the Hegotá upgrade, and EIP-7932), a hash-based state tree (EIP-7864), and Lean Ethereum: leanXMSS, a hash-based signature scheme for validators in place of BLS, aggregated with SNARK proofs in a minimal zero-knowledge virtual machine (leanVM), with core infrastructure targeted for about 2029.
For accounts, a lean adaptation of the NIST hash-based standard SPHINCS+ (SLH-DSA) is being finalized, built for hardware wallets, multi-party signing and aggregation; an EVM-optimized variant that needs no protocol change was proposed in June 2026. The L1 is choosing hash-based schemes over the lattice-based NIST standards (ML-DSA) because a scheme meant to last decades should rest on the fewest assumptions, and researchers put a significant chance on lattices being attacked in the coming years; the lattice standards remain an option for faster movers. The Foundation’s Post-Quantum team (formed January 2026) describes the path as three phases, readiness and infrastructure, gradual opt-in adoption, then protocol-level consolidation, with no flag day: protocol upgrades could be complete by 2029 and the execution-layer migration takes years beyond; its primer for governments (July 2026) presents this as hardening critical infrastructure before the threat materializes, through the open upgrade process.
Ethereum Foundation, Ethereum Basics for Governments and Institutions (ethereum.org report, July 2026; the Foundation’s own positions; comparative figures as of March 2026 from OpenZeppelin’s assessment) (checked 2026-11-10); ethereum.org, Quantum resistance (page updated 23 October 2026): about 1,200 logical qubits to break 256-bit elliptic-curve keys per March 2026 research; hardware around the end of the decade at the earliest; leanXMSS and leanVM; EIP-8141 considered for Hegotá; core infrastructure about 2029; dormant wallets an open governance topic (checked 2026-11-06); Ethereum Foundation, Post-Quantum Ethereum portal (updated 27 June 2026): not imminent, most roadmaps early to mid 2030s; Execution, Consensus and Data layers; leanXMSS, leanSig, leanVM, leanSpec; SPHINCS+ a candidate for the execution layer; cryptographic agility; L1 upgrades by 2029; a USD 20 million formal verification project (checked 2026-11-06); Drake, Khovratovich, Kudinov and Wagner, Technical Note: LeanSig for Post-Quantum Ethereum (IACR ePrint 2025/1332, revised 12 September 2025): a hash-based multi-signature instantiation for the consensus layer (checked 2026-11-06); Cointelegraph, Ethereum can quantum-proof accounts for 7 cents (14 June 2026; secondary): SPHINCS-, an EVM-optimized family derived from SPHINCS+, from the Ethereum Foundation Kohaku lead, without a hard fork; a bridge to leanSPHINCS with aggregation (checked 2026-11-06); Devcon India, post-quantum Q&A with Ethereum Foundation researcher Justin Drake (November 2026; video, transcript read 6 November 2026): earliest 2029 and expected 2032, three years earlier than two years before; coordination the bottleneck, one upgrade about every ten months, 2028 at the earliest on the current cadence; a lean adaptation of SPHINCS+ for accounts, hash-based over lattices for the L1; proof of seed; custodians in bunker mode; the post-AI threat (checked 2026-11-06); EIP-7932, Secondary signature algorithms (Draft) (checked 2026-10-25); EIP-7864, Ethereum state using a unified binary tree (Draft) (checked 2026-10-25); EIP-8081, Hardfork Meta: Hegotá (Draft): EIP-8141, frame transactions, scheduled for inclusion; no activation dates set (checked 2026-11-14)
The community’s own estimate of the threat moved forward in 2026. ethereum.org puts a capable machine around the end of the decade at the earliest, citing research that about 1,200 logical qubits would break a 256-bit elliptic-curve key, and notes that NIST expects to deprecate ECDSA by 2030 and disallow it by 2035; the Ethereum Foundation’s post-quantum team wrote in mid 2026 that most roadmaps place it in the early to mid 2030s and that it is not imminent; and at Devcon in November 2026 its researchers gave 2029 as the earliest and 2032 as the expected date, three years earlier than their estimate of two years before.
One of them had already put the odds at 10% by 2030 and 50% by 2032, in June, after Google’s March result. On the protocol side the bottleneck is now coordination rather than technology: upgrades ship about every ten months, so the earliest protocol-level migration on the current cadence is 2028, sooner if client teams make it the priority. The plan is moving earlier. In June the Foundation’s portal placed post-quantum validator attestations in L*; its strawmap, updated on 2 November 2026, places post-quantum key registrations in Hegotá (2027), post-quantum transactions and proofs in I* (2028), and post-quantum attestations and data sampling, completing a hash-based L1, in J* (2028–29). On 12 November the All Core Devs consensus call discussed how urgent the threat is and the realistic options to accelerate, and many developers favored reprioritizing the roadmap toward post-quantum work; no decision has been recorded. Every date here is a target or an estimate, not a commitment.
The Ethereum Foundation’s post-quantum portal →
ethereum.org, Quantum resistance (page updated 23 October 2026): about 1,200 logical qubits to break 256-bit elliptic-curve keys per March 2026 research; hardware around the end of the decade at the earliest; leanXMSS and leanVM; EIP-8141 considered for Hegotá; core infrastructure about 2029; dormant wallets an open governance topic (checked 2026-11-06); Ethereum Foundation, Post-Quantum Ethereum portal (updated 27 June 2026): not imminent, most roadmaps early to mid 2030s; Execution, Consensus and Data layers; leanXMSS, leanSig, leanVM, leanSpec; SPHINCS+ a candidate for the execution layer; cryptographic agility; L1 upgrades by 2029; a USD 20 million formal verification project (checked 2026-11-06); Devcon India, post-quantum Q&A with Ethereum Foundation researcher Justin Drake (November 2026; video, transcript read 6 November 2026): earliest 2029 and expected 2032, three years earlier than two years before; coordination the bottleneck, one upgrade about every ten months, 2028 at the earliest on the current cadence; a lean adaptation of SPHINCS+ for accounts, hash-based over lattices for the L1; proof of seed; custodians in bunker mode; the post-AI threat (checked 2026-11-06); Bankless, Justin Drake puts quantum Q-Day odds at 50% by 2032 (2 June 2026; secondary, reporting his post on X): 10% by 2030 and 50% by 2032; Google kept its optimizations behind a zero-knowledge proof after engaging with the US government, and an independent researcher rediscovered the main one (checked 2026-11-14); Ethereum Foundation, strawmap (drawing updated 2 November 2026; work-in-progress rough consensus, not authoritative): post-quantum registrations in Hegotá (2027); leanVM proofs and leanSPHINCS transactions in I* (2028); leanXMSS attestations and leanDA sampling, a hash-based post-quantum L1, in J* (2028–29) (checked 2026-11-14); Ethereum protocol meetings, All Core Devs Consensus call #191 (12 November 2026), agenda: what level of urgency for the post-quantum and post-AI landscape, and realistic options to accelerate hardening the consensus layer (checked 2026-11-14); Christine D. Kim, From Devcon to DEFCON (13 November 2026; secondary summary of the call): most developers placed post-quantum urgency between levels 2 and 3, and many felt the roadmap should be reprioritized toward post-quantum code changes (checked 2026-11-14)
Keep long-lived holdings on addresses that have never spent, move funds to a fresh address after every spend where keys are already exposed, prefer smart accounts whose signature scheme can be rotated, and ask every proof system and bridge you rely on whether it rests on pairings or on hashes.
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This map is an Ethereum Institutional house view for discussion, not legal advice. © 2026 Ethereum Institutional. Licensed under CC BY-SA 4.0 (share and adapt with credit, under the same license). Version 1137e34 · built 2026-11-16