Ethereum Institutional · Research · Quantum

Where it bites a ledger

Four places, in the order a risk committee would rank them, the emergency plan and what it does not cover, what a ledger does about coins nobody can move, and what is not at risk on a public ledger but is at risk everywhere else.

Where it bites a ledger

Your keys

An address is a hash, so an account that has only received funds exposes nothing. The first transaction it sends reveals the public key; from then on the key is exposed.

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Reused addresses, hot wallets and multisig signers are the exposed set. The practice Ethereum Foundation researchers recommend now, for a custodian or a treasury with keys already exposed, is a calm migration into what they call bunker mode: move funds to fresh addresses whose public keys stay hidden behind the hash, and after every spend move the remainder to a fresh address again. It needs no new cryptography and no new wallet, and there is no emergency; take the time to do it in an orderly way.

How a quantum emergency fork would save most funds (Vitalik Buterin, 2024) →

Sources (2)

Decrypt, Ethereum researcher says AI may break encryption before quantum does (7 October 2026; secondary): the worst case in months not years; bunker mode; curves vulnerable, hashes preferred; no attack demonstrated (checked 2026-11-06); Devcon India, post-quantum Q&A with Ethereum Foundation researcher Justin Drake (November 2026; video, transcript read 6 November 2026): earliest 2029 and expected 2032, three years earlier than two years before; coordination the bottleneck, one upgrade about every ten months, 2028 at the earliest on the current cadence; a lean adaptation of SPHINCS+ for accounts, hash-based over lattices for the L1; proof of seed; custodians in bunker mode; the post-AI threat (checked 2026-11-06)

Seed phrases survive; wallets and addresses change

A seed phrase produces keys by hashing, so the seed itself is not exposed by anything a quantum computer can do; the same seed can derive post-quantum addresses once wallets support them, and the migration is a new address from an old seed, not a new secret.

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That is also the basis of the emergency plan: if a capable machine arrived before the migration, a hard fork could freeze elliptic-curve signatures and let holders move funds by proving, in zero knowledge, that they know the seed their address was derived from. It covers most accounts and not all: custody built on multi-party computation has no seed phrase, so a custodian needs signature agility of its own before the emergency, and the exposure practice above in the meantime.

How a quantum emergency fork would save most funds (ethresear.ch, 2024) →

Sources (3)

How to hard-fork to save most users’ funds in a quantum emergency (ethresear.ch, 9 March 2024) (checked 2026-10-26); Devcon India, post-quantum Q&A with Ethereum Foundation researcher Justin Drake (November 2026; video, transcript read 6 November 2026): earliest 2029 and expected 2032, three years earlier than two years before; coordination the bottleneck, one upgrade about every ten months, 2028 at the earliest on the current cadence; a lean adaptation of SPHINCS+ for accounts, hash-based over lattices for the L1; proof of seed; custodians in bunker mode; the post-AI threat (checked 2026-11-06); ethereum.org, Quantum resistance (page updated 23 October 2026): about 1,200 logical qubits to break 256-bit elliptic-curve keys per March 2026 research; hardware around the end of the decade at the earliest; leanXMSS and leanVM; EIP-8141 considered for Hegotá; core infrastructure about 2029; dormant wallets an open governance topic (checked 2026-11-06)

Validators, data and proofs

Validator signatures (BLS), blob commitments (KZG) and pairing-based rollup proofs share the same exposure and are the protocol’s job to replace. STARK-based rollups are already safe.

The four areas Ethereum must upgrade →

Where other ledgers stand

An independent assessment of six networks (OpenZeppelin, conditions as of March 2026) found that none had deployed quantum-resistant cryptography: Ethereum had the most active research programme, the XRP Ledger and Solana early projects (an experimental XRPL network and post-quantum signatures on a Solana test network), and BNB Smart Chain, TRON and Canton no published plan, though an EVM chain can inherit Ethereum’s protections.

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The report’s point for institutions is the one this page makes: migrating live financial infrastructure takes years, so the plan has to exist before the threat does.

Sources (1)

OpenZeppelin, Technical Risk Assessment on Blockchain Networks (report dated 30 April 2026, conditions as of early March 2026; Ethereum, BNB Smart Chain, XRP Ledger, TRON, Solana and Canton across six dimensions; industry report, no ranking) (checked 2026-11-10)

What is not at risk, and what is at risk everywhere else

A public ledger keeps no secrets, so there is nothing to harvest now and decrypt later; the risk is forgery of authorization, not disclosure. Off the ledger it is the reverse: encrypted traffic, records and backups can be captured today and read later, which is why banking, healthcare, government and telecoms face the same deadline with less visibility of where their cryptography sits.

Coins nobody can move

Some exposed coins will never be moved by their owners, because the keys are lost. A ledger then chooses between leaving them to whoever builds the machine, which turns lost coins into a bounty for breaking the cryptography, and freezing them by a rule change. ethereum.org lists dormant wallets as an open governance topic with no community consensus yet; Ethereum Foundation researchers expect the exposed and lost share on Ethereum mainnet to be small enough to leave alone, and note that a ledger with a large lost share faces the harder choice.

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Ethereum Institutional records the question rather than an answer: the decision belongs to each ledger’s governance, and the Adoption page’s property-rights dial discloses every past intervention.

Sources (2)

ethereum.org, Quantum resistance (page updated 23 October 2026): about 1,200 logical qubits to break 256-bit elliptic-curve keys per March 2026 research; hardware around the end of the decade at the earliest; leanXMSS and leanVM; EIP-8141 considered for Hegotá; core infrastructure about 2029; dormant wallets an open governance topic (checked 2026-11-06); Devcon India, post-quantum Q&A with Ethereum Foundation researcher Justin Drake (November 2026; video, transcript read 6 November 2026): earliest 2029 and expected 2032, three years earlier than two years before; coordination the bottleneck, one upgrade about every ten months, 2028 at the earliest on the current cadence; a lean adaptation of SPHINCS+ for accounts, hash-based over lattices for the L1; proof of seed; custodians in bunker mode; the post-AI threat (checked 2026-11-06)

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This map is an Ethereum Institutional house view for discussion, not legal advice. © 2026 Ethereum Institutional. Licensed under CC BY-SA 4.0 (share and adapt with credit, under the same license). Version 1137e34 · built 2026-11-16